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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan Gutierrez appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after he conditionally
pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Idaho Code § 18-3316. He
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and his motion for a specific jury
instruction, both based on the absence of a definition of “firearm” in § 18-3316 following
legislative amendment of that statute in 2015. The district court erred in denying Mr. Gutierrez’s
motion to dismiss because § 18-3316 is unconstitutionally vague as applied. Alternatively, the
district court erred in denying Mr. Gutierrez’s motion for a specific jury instruction defining
“firearm” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1921 as that statute defines “firearm” in a way that is most
favorable to the defendant and gives maximum scope to the people’s right to bear arms.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Gutierrez was charged by Information with unlawful possession of a firearm and
possession of drug paraphernalia following a traffic stop. (R., pp.10-11, 16-18.) Mr. Gutierrez
possessed a black powder muzzle loading pistol at the time he was stopped. (R., pp.17, 29, 41,
48; Conf. Exs., p.26.)
The State filed a motion in limine prior to trial asking the district court to bar the defense
from arguing a muzzle loading pistol does not qualify as a firearm for purposes of § 18-3316.
(R., pp.29-31.) The State relied primarily on State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352 (Ct. App. 2006),
stating that case “makes it clear that a muzzle loader is a firearm.” (R., pp.29-30.) The State did
not mention the fact that § 18-3316 was amended in 2015, well after Dolsby was decided, and
that the amended version of § 18-3316 does not define the term “firearm.” (See R., pp.29-30.) It
does not appear that the district court ever ruled on the State’s motion. (See R., p.5.)
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Prior to trial, Mr. Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss Count I of the Information arguing
§ 18-3316 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the terms “firearm” and
“possess.” (R., pp.36-38.) The State filed an objection to Mr. Gutierrez’s motion. (R., pp.40-46.)
The State argued, among other things, that § 18-3316 is not unconstitutionally vague because,
although the term “firearm” is not defined in § 18-3316, that term is defined in another statute,
§ 18-3302, to mean “any weapon that will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive,” and that “general definition is the best suited for Idaho
Code 18-3316.” (R., pp.44-45.)
Mr. Gutierrez also filed a motion for a specific jury instruction, asking the district court
to provide the jury with the definition of “firearm” as contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921, because
Idaho Code § 18-3302D(2)(b) states the term “firearm” “means any firearm defined in 18 U.S.C.
921.” 1 (R., pp.32-35.) The State filed an objection to Mr. Gutierrez’s motion. (R., pp.47-51.) The
State argued, among other things, that the district court should instruct the jury as set forth in
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1402, which includes the definition of firearm that was used in
§ 18-3316 prior to its amendment in 2015. (R., p.48.) The State argued, in the alternative, that the
district court should instruct the jury as set forth in Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1602, as the
definition of firearm contained in that instruction “is nearly identical to the definition” that was
included in the repealed version of § 18-3316. (R., pp.50-51.)
Following a brief hearing, the district court denied Mr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss and
motion for a specific jury instruction, relying principally on Dolsby. (R., p.52; Tr., p.13, Ls.910.) Mr. Gutierrez then entered a conditional guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm,
1

18 U.S.C. § 921 excludes from the definition of “firearm” any “antique firearm,” which is
defined to mean, among other things, “any muzzle loading rifle, muzzle loading shotgun, or
muzzle loading pistol, which is designed to use black powder, or a black powder substitute, and
which cannot use fixed ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(3), 921(a)(16)(C).
2

reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his pretrial motions. (R., pp.53-71; Tr., p.15,
Ls.7-21.) The district court accepted Mr. Gutierrez’s conditional plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 11(a)(2). (Tr., p.24, L.20; R., pp.68-71.)
At sentencing, the prosecutor argued probation was appropriate notwithstanding the
presentence investigator’s recommendation for a rider because “the specific firearm in question
can give rise to some measure of leniency.” (5/8/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.22-24; Conf. Exs., p.15.) Counsel
for Mr. Gutierrez argued “this is not the firearm that people in gangs or drug dealers use or carry
to defend themselves or to intimidate other people.” (5/8/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-22.) Counsel
explained, “This really is a situation where he simply was collecting a firearm that is an antique.”
(5/8/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.22-24.) The district court sentenced Mr. Gutierrez to a unified term of three
years, with one year fixed, and then suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Gutierrez on
probation. (5/8/19 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-10; R., pp.73-74.) The judgment of conviction was entered on
May 13, 2019, and Mr. Gutierrez filed a timely notice of appeal on June 4, 2019. (R., pp.77-83.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss Count I of the
Information?

II.

Alternatively, did the district court err in denying Mr. Gutierrez’s motion for a specific
jury instruction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gutierrez’s Motion To Dismiss Count I Of The
Information
A.

Introduction
Idaho Code § 18-3316 states, in full:
(1)

A person who previously has been convicted of a felony who purchases,
owns, possesses, or has under his custody or control any firearm shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a period
of time not to exceed five (5) years and by a fine not to exceed five
thousand dollars ($5,000).

(2)

For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, “convicted of a felony”
shall include a person who has entered a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or
has been found guilty of any of the crimes enumerated in section 18-310,
Idaho Code, or to a comparable felony crime in another state, territory,
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States.

(3)

Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a person whose conviction
has been nullified by expungement, pardon, setting aside the conviction or
other comparable procedure by the jurisdiction where the felony
conviction occurred; or whose civil right to bear arms either specifically or
in combination with other civil rights has been restored by any other
provision of Idaho law.

Prior to its amendment in 2015, § 18-3316 contained an additional paragraph, which stated:
For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, “firearm” shall include any
weapon from which a shot, projectile or other object may be discharged by force
of combustion, explosive, gas and/or mechanical means, whether operable or
inoperable.
2015 Idaho Laws Ch. 303 (H.B. 301). The legislature omitted the definitional paragraph from
§ 18-3316 through the 2015 amendment. Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Court of
Appeals has considered the effect of the omission of this paragraph.
Mr. Gutierrez argues on appeal, as he did in the district court, that the 2015 amendment
to § 18-3316 had the effect of rendering the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, as
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the statute no longer defines with specificity the conduct it prohibits. Mr. Gutierrez possessed a
muzzle loading pistol, which would have been a firearm within the meaning of § 18-3316 prior
to the 2015 amendment, but which is arguably not a firearm within the meaning of the amended
statute. Because § 18-3316 is unconstitutionally vague as applied, the district court erred in
denying Mr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss Count I of the Information.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews de novo a claim that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, __, 444 P.3d 877, 881 (2019).

C.

Idaho Code § 18-3316 Is Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied
“The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute defining
criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does not
allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Cook, 444 P.3d at 881 (citation omitted). “[A]s
a matter of due process, no one may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes.” Id. (citations omitted).
“To succeed on an ‘as applied’ vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that the
statute, as applied to the defendant’s conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant’s
conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had
unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him or her.” Cook, 444 P.3d at 882.
(quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted). “When analyzing vagueness, the words of a
statute alleged to be unconstitutionally vague should not be evaluated in the abstract, but
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considered in reference to the particular conduct of the defendant challenging the statute.” Id.
(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “Those words are given their commonly
understood, everyday meanings, unless the legislature has provided a definition.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The district court erred in rejecting Mr. Gutierrez’s vagueness challenge because § 183316 failed to provide fair notice to Mr. Gutierrez that his conduct of possessing a muzzle
loading pistol was prohibited, leaving the police with unbridled discretion in determining
whether to arrest him. Defense counsel argued in the district court that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague because “[m]y client isn’t put on notice as to what constitutes a firearm
per the statute.” (Tr., p.2, L.24 – p.3, L.2.) He argued, “we don’t know what activities are
prohibited or allowed.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-3.) The prosecutor argued in response that “the intent [of
the legislature] is to collect everything.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.8-10.) He continued, “It’s supposed to be
all firearms, whether they are old firearms, whether they are working firearms, whether they’re
antique firearms, whether they’re basically a brass firearm hanging over someone’s fireplace
from a long time ago.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.10-14.) Despite making this argument, the prosecutor
acknowledged “it certainly would behoove the legislature to be more clear on this subject and to
write their . . . legislation in a way that the public can easily follow.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.11-14.)
The district court relied on Dolsby in rejecting Mr. Gutierrez’s argument. (Tr., p.12, L.18
– p.13, L.10.) The court noted the defendant in Dolsby “mistakenly thought that [a] muzzleloader
was not a firearm [within the meaning of § 18-3316] and that he could possess a muzzleloader,”
but the Court of Appeals concluded the State did not have to prove the defendant “intended to
violate the law.” (Tr., p.12, L.22 – p.13, L.2.) The district court looked to § 18-3302 as providing
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the definition for § 18-3316, but did not specifically discuss the language of § 18-3316 or the
impact of the 2015 amendment of that statute. (Tr., p.13, Ls.3-9.)
Dolsby does not control the result here, as it was based on the pre-2015 version of § 183316, which specifically defined the term “firearm” for the purpose of that statute. 143 Idaho at
354-55. The defendant in Dolsby argued the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to present evidence at trial on the defense of misfortune, and the Court rejected that
argument, concluding the defendant’s knowing possession of a firearm “is all that the state is
required to prove.” Id. at 355. The issue in this case is not whether Mr. Gutierrez could present a
defense of misfortune; instead, the issue is whether the muzzle loading pistol he possessed was a
firearm within the meaning of § 18-3316 as amended.
The ambiguity created by the lack of a definition for the term “firearm” following the
2015 amendment of § 18-3316 rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to
Mr. Gutierrez. It left the officers who stopped his vehicle with the ability to arbitrarily and
discriminatorily enforce our penal laws, despite the recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court that
“lawmaking should not be entrusted to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his
beat.” State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 930 (2010) (quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted).
When all is said and done, the wording of § 18-3316 undermined Mr. Gutierrez’s ability to
discern what conduct was required so that he could properly confirm his behavior to the law, and
was thus unconstitutional. See Cook, 444 P.3d at 884. The district court erred in denying
Mr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss Count I of the Information.
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II.
Alternatively, The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gutierrez’s Motion For A Specific Jury
Instruction
A.

Introduction
Prior to the scheduled trial, Mr. Gutierrez filed a motion for a specific jury instruction

defining “firearm” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 921, because that statute is “most favorable and
most lenient for the defendant.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.4-6.) The district court erred in denying
Mr. Gutierrez’s motion, because, as discussed above, the term “firearm” is not defined in § 183316, and this Court should interpret the statute in a way that is most favorable to the defendant
and gives maximum scope to the people’s right to bear arms.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court exercises free review over the propriety of a requested jury instruction.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). This Court also exercises free review over
questions of statutory interpretation. State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 106 (2015).

C.

Idaho Code § 18-3316 Should Be Interpreted As Incorporating The Definition Of
“Firearm” Contained In 18 U.S.C. § 921, And The Jury Should Have Been Instructed
Accordingly
As discussed above, Idaho Code § 18-3316 prohibits a person who has previously has

been convicted of a felony from possessing “any firearm,” but, following amendment of that
statute in 2015, does not define the term “firearm.” There are at least two possible definitions of
the term “firearm” that could be read into § 18-3316—the first from Idaho Code § 18-3302 and
the second from 18 U.S.C. § 921, which is incorporated by reference in Idaho Code § 183302D(2)(b).
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Counsel for Mr. Gutierrez argued in the district court that the jury should be provided
with the definition of “firearm” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921 because that definition is “most
favorable and most lenient for the defendant.” (Tr., p.6, Ls.20-22, p.10, Ls.4-6.) The district
court rejected Mr. Gutierrez’s argument, concluding the term “firearm” should be defined for
purposes of § 18-3316 as set forth in § 18-3302. (Tr., p.13, Ls.3-10.) In reaching its decision, the
district court did not discuss general principles of statutory interpretation or cite any legal
authority. (See id.)
“A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all matters of law
necessary for the jury’s information.” State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 867 (2019) (citation
omitted). Where a party requests a particular instruction, the court must give the requested
instruction if it is correct and pertinent. See id. “A proposed instruction is not correct and
pertinent if it is: (1) an erroneous statement of the law; (2) adequately covered by other
instructions; or (3) not supported by the facts of the case.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jeske, 164 Idaho at 872. The district court erred
in failing to instruct the jury as to the definition of firearm contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921 because,
under general principles of statutory instruction, § 18-3316 should be read to incorporate the
definition of “firearm” contained in that statute. The definition of “firearm” contained in 18
U.S.C. § 921 was thus correct and pertinent for the jury’s consideration.
Statutory construction “must begin with the literal words of the statute” and “those words
must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning.” City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep.
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003) (citations omitted). “If the statute is not ambiguous, this
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” Id. (citations omitted). Idaho
Code § 18-3316, as amended in 2015, is ambiguous because the term “firearm” is capable of
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more than one reasonable construction. See City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69 (stating “[a]
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction”)
(citation omitted). It could, like the pre-2015 version of the statute, include muzzle loading
pistols within its purview, or it could, like 18 U.S.C. § 921, exclude such antique firearms. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(3), 921(a)(16)(C) (excluding from the definition of “firearm” any “antique
firearm,” which is defined to mean, among other things, “any muzzle loading rifle, muzzle
loading shotgun, or muzzle loading pistol, which is designed to use black powder, or a black
powder substitute, and which cannot use fixed ammunition”).
Because § 18-3316, as amended, is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation,
this Court must construe the statute “to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean.” City
of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69 (citation omitted). In determining legislative intent, this Court
“examine[s] not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.” Id. (citations
omitted). The district court believed the legislature intended that the definition of firearm
contained in § 18-3302 carry over to § 18-3316, but the court did not cite any basis for this
belief. (Tr., p.13, Ls.3-9.)
Idaho Code § 18-3302, titled Concealed weapons, provides, in its first paragraph, that
“[t]he provisions of this chapter regulating the carrying of weapons must be strictly construed so
as to give maximum scope to the rights retained by the people.” I.C. § 18-3302(1). The
legislature then defines various terms for the purpose of the chapter—including the term
“firearm” to mean “any weapon that will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive.” I.C. § 18-3302(2)(d). Looking at the plain language of
§ 18-3302, there appear to be two conflicting pronouncements—the first that the term “firearm”
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should be construed as narrowly as possible, giving maximum scope to the people’s right to bear
arms; the second that the term “firearm” should be construed broadly, presumably to allow
people to possess such weapons.
Idaho Code § 18-3302D, titled Possessing weapons or firearms on school property,
contains a very different definition of firearm. It defines “firearm” for the purpose of this section
to mean “any firearm as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921.” I.C. § 18-3302D(2)(b). 18 U.S.C. § 921
excludes from the definition of “firearm” any “antique firearm,” which is defined to mean,
among other things, “any muzzle loading rifle, muzzle loading shotgun, or muzzle loading pistol,
which is designed to use black powder, or a black powder substitute, and which cannot use fixed
ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(3), 921(a)(16)(C). The Idaho legislature thus adopted a
narrower definition of firearm when it was prohibiting people from possessing firearms—that is,
when it was limiting, as opposed to expanding, gun rights.
Like § 18-3302D, § 18-3316, titled Unlawful possession of a firearm, prohibits certain
people from possessing firearms. It seems reasonable to assume that the Idaho legislature would,
in limiting gun rights in § 18-3316, define the term “firearm” narrowly, as in § 18-3302D, rather
than broadly, as in § 18-3302. In terms of public safety, which is presumably the public policy
consideration underlying § 18-3316, a convicted felon does not pose a real danger to society by
possessing an antique firearm, which both the prosecutor and defense counsel acknowledged in
making their recommendations at sentencing. (5/8/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.22-24, p.7, Ls.17-24.)
If this Court believes, “after examining the text, context, history, and policy of the
statute,” that there is still an “interpretive tie” regarding the definition of “firearm” for the
purpose of § 18-3316, the tie must be resolved in favor of the defendant under the rule of lenity.
See State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2014); see also State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho
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99, 103 (2008) (“The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor
of defendants.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Brown v. State, 137 Idaho 529, 536
(Ct. App. 2002) (stating that “to the extent the theft statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity
compels us to construe it in favor of the accused”).
The district court’s error in denying Mr. Gutierrez’s motion for a specific instruction is
reversible error because it prejudiced Mr. Gutierrez. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 710 (stating an
error in jury instructions constitutes reversible error where, among other things, it “prejudiced
the party challenging the instruction”). There does not appear to be any dispute that the muzzle
loading pistol which Mr. Gutierrez possessed would be a firearm as defined in § 18-3302, but
would not be a firearm as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921. The district court erred in denying
Mr. Gutierrez’s motion for a specific jury instruction, and, even if the Court concludes § 18-3302
is not unconstitutionally vague as applied, Mr. Gutierrez is still entitled to relief on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gutierrez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2020.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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